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RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL:
SUPERVISED RELEASE AND THE PROBLEM OF
SECOND-CLASS STATUS
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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Haymond shone a light on
a practice that has not yet received attention commensurate with its significance: the
re-imprisonment of individuals on supervised release without a jury trial. At first
blush, the decision is most notable for setting bounds on the government’s ability to
re-imprison individuals on supervised release without observing the constitutional
rights normally available to defendants in criminal prosecutions. However,
examination of the opinions reveals that the decision’s immediate doctrinal impact
was quite limited. Moreover, although the three opinions issued in the case reflected
disagreements among the Justices, all of the Justices nevertheless took for granted a
proposition that ought to be recognized as remarkable: namely, that it is acceptable for
individuals released from prison to be subjected for extended periods of time to a status
of significantly diminished constitutional protection. This Article challenges the
practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised release without the normal
constitutional protections, contending that its current widespread acceptance is based
on underlying assumptions that do not hold up to scrutiny.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Haymond1 shone a light on
an issue that has not yet received attention commensurate with its significance: the
common practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised release without a jury
trial. Although the decision’s immediate doctrinal impact was quite limited, Haymond
was notable for setting constraints on the government’s ability to re-imprison
individuals on supervised release without observing the constitutional rights normally
available to defendants in criminal prosecutions.
In some respects, the three separate opinions issued in the case indicated
substantial divisions among the Justices. In particular, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion
for the four plurality Justices rested its reasoning on a precedent—Apprendi v. New
Jersey2—that Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for the four dissenting Justices
considered inapplicable.3 Meanwhile, in providing a fifth vote for the majority, Justice
Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion largely sided with the dissent, including its view
that Apprendi was inapposite, but found other grounds to reach the same outcome as
the plurality on the dispute at hand. Notwithstanding the significant disagreements
between the plurality and dissenting Justices, however, all three of the opinions in
Haymond took for granted a proposition that ought to be recognized as remarkable:
namely, that it is acceptable for individuals released from prison to be subjected for
extended periods of time to a status of significantly diminished constitutional
protection.
After individuals convicted of crimes complete a term in prison, they are
commonly subject to a period of “supervised release,” which conditions their
continued liberty on a variety of requirements, including that they do not commit
additional crimes.4 If the government believes that a person on supervised release has
violated one or more of the requirements, it may seek a term of re-imprisonment.
Although individuals in these circumstances are potentially subject to long terms of
imprisonment, they are not entitled to the full set of constitutional rights normally
afforded to defendants in criminal cases. Most notably, they are not provided a trial in
which guilt must be demonstrated “beyond a reasonable doubt” to a jury.5 Rather, their

1 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019).
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2006).
3 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2379 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468); id. at 2388–89 (Alito, J.
dissenting). Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion was joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh.
4 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See generally ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. PROB. &
PRETRIAL SERVS. OFF., OVERVIEW OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS
(2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_
conditions_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ92-ZJAB].
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that the accused in “all criminal
prosecutions shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” U.S CONST.
amend. VI, and the Supreme Court has long held that due process requires that the guilt of
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cases are decided by judges at evidentiary hearings in which the government must
only demonstrate the defendant’s guilt by “a preponderance of the evidence”
(indicating that the government’s allegations are more likely than not to be true).6
In 2019, in the federal system alone—this Article’s principal focus—there were
over 111,000 individuals on supervised release.7 A 2010 study by the United States
Sentencing Commission reported that the federal court system had by that point
imposed terms of supervised release on nearly one million individuals.8 Indeed, the
vast majority of federal offenders who are sentenced to prison also serve terms of
supervised release. Terms of supervised release do not merely represent brief stints
while an individual freed from prison is getting settled into the logistical details of a
new life. Rather, the average term of supervised release is nearly four years.9
Throughout this entire period, individuals on supervised release may be re-imprisoned
for up to five years without anything close to the constitutional protections that would
normally be afforded to an individual facing the full force of the criminal law. Nor is
the threat of revocation merely theoretical; roughly one-third of individuals sentenced
to terms of supervised release are subjected to revocation and re-imprisonment for an
average term of nearly a year, and, in some cases, for much longer terms.10 In 2018
alone, the federal courts adjudicated almost 17,000 revocations of supervised
release.11
This Article argues that the practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised
release without the normal constitutional protections is not justified. Part II sets the
context for the contemporary practice of supervised release by examining its
background in the adoption of a parole system over a century ago. It is striking that
the current system affords greatly diminished rights for large populations of people
who are not imprisoned, and that the practice is so widely accepted. We might have
expected the Supreme Court block this practice. To the contrary, however, the Justices
have articulated justifications for it. Part III discusses those justifications, which pivot
on the legal fiction that revocation of supervised release does not constitute the
imposition of a new punishment. Instead, according to this line of reasoning, the
revocation of supervised release should be understood simply as part of the ongoing

criminal charges be established “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361
(1970).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
7 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 [https://perma.cc/URE3-H4Y9].
8 U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 3 (2010),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6BA-2EQW].
9 Number of Offenders on Federal Supervised Release Hits All-Time High, PEW 1 (Jan. 24,
2017)
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/01/number_of_offenders_on_federal_supervised_release_hits_alltime_hig
h.pdf.
10 U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 8, at 63.
11 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2388 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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administration of the original sentence of imprisonment. Part IV contends that the
justifications for the current system do not hold up to scrutiny. Once the notion that
revocation of supervised release does not constitute a new punishment is exposed as a
fiction, the commonly repeated justifications for the diminished rights available at
revocation hearings fall apart. We are left, then, with a system that unjustifiably
deprives numerous individuals of the most cherished protections in our criminal
justice system. Since these are individuals who have already completed their prison
terms and resumed their lives, this practice has the effect of relegating a large
population of individuals to a second-class status of rights protection. In the absence
of a valid basis for the establishment of such an inferior status, the practice should be
recognized as deeply problematic. Part V highlights how little Haymond altered the
practice of re-imprisonment without a jury trial, and how much is at stake for
individuals on supervised release.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE—FROM PAROLE TO SUPERVISED RELEASE
A. Parole and the Historical Background of Supervised Release
To put the contemporary practice of supervised release in context, it is necessary
to consider its historical roots in the much earlier adoption of a parole system. In the
period shortly after the Constitution’s ratification, the predominant view of criminal
penalties was that they served a retributive purpose: to mete out the punishment that
criminals deserved based on the offenses committed.12 This view about the aim of
punishment had implications for the manner in which sentences were determined. If
the penalty was intended as retribution for the offense committed, then it made sense
to link the determination of the sentence tightly to the nature of the offense. The
relevant variables were those differentiating one kind of crime from another. This
conception of punishment’s aim, then, did not focus attention on variables
differentiating one perpetrator from another.13 Since, unlike individual human beings,
the facts of an act already committed cannot change, this view of punishment’s aim
did not require an updating of the time to be served in prison based on events
transpiring after the sentencing. As a result, those sentenced to prison commonly
served their terms in full.14
The emphasis on punishment’s retributive aims made questions about when
defendants enjoyed certain constitutional rights pertaining to criminal procedure
relatively straightforward. Consider the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury . . . .”15 Under the early model of criminal penalties as retribution,
determining when the jury right applied was generally uncomplicated because

12 Robert McClendon, Note, Supervising Supervised Release: Where the Courts Went Wrong
on Revocation and How U.S. v. Haymond Finally Got It Right, 54 TULSA L. REV. 175, 180
(2018).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 U.S CONST. amend. VI.
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“criminal prosecution” for Sixth Amendment purposes meant simply the stage where
the government brought formal accusations against the defendant.16
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a major shift had occurred in
attitudes regarding the principal aims of punishment. By this time, the prevailing view
was that punishment should aim to rehabilitate criminals, reforming their character
and reintegrating them into society.17 This shift in attitudes regarding the aim of
criminal penalties played a critical role in the adoption of parole as an overarching
approach to punishment. The guiding idea behind parole was that sentences should be
administered in a manner tailored to the circumstances of particular individuals in an
effort to reintegrate them into society as law-abiding members of society.18 Pursuing
such a vision required responsiveness to each person’s progress, and this meant an
approach to sentencing that was individualized and flexible. Not all individuals
convicted of crimes progress toward safe and productive reentry into society at the
same pace. Sadly, some individuals never make any progress at all. Others, however,
demonstrate signs of readiness for reintegration relatively soon after beginning to
serve their prison terms.19 Thus, the system had to allow for adjustment in the light of
developments that took place after the initial announcement of a prison term. This was
a change from the previous system. Since the earlier model that predominated in the
nation’s early history tied sentences to the nature of the crimes committed—which did
not change after the fact—it did not require the same kind of flexibility in
administering sentences.
To instill the requisite flexibility, the new model of criminal justice allowed for
discretion in a number of ways. Through the establishment of broad penalty ranges,
judges were afforded a good deal of discretion in determining the sentence for
particular defendants at the outset. Within the sentencing range provided by
legislation, judges could sentence defendants to a narrower range of time that they
might have to serve. Moreover, once the minimum sentence was served, a parole
board—an arm of the executive branch—exercised discretion in determining the
actual release date. Within the prescribed range, parole boards could grant an earlier
release based on good behavior and progress toward rehabilitation.20 In some cases,
individuals could be released from prison after serving as little as one-third of the
original maximum range on their sentence.21 While individuals in the parole system
could be released early, such individuals—known as “parolees”—were subject to

16 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2376.
17 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
18 Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory, and Results of Parole, 18 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 24, 51 (1927).
19 McClendon, supra note 12, at 180.
20 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised
Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 188–89 (2013).
21 James Horner, Haymond’s Riddles: Supervised Release, the Jury Trial Right, and the
Government’s Path Forward, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 279 (2020).
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certain requirements which they had to fulfill in order to retain their freedom.22 In
addition to reporting periodically to their parole officer, parolees were required to
comply with a variety of other conditions, such as that they not consume alcohol or
associate with certain persons, or that they not travel, marry, or change employment
without the permission of their assigned parole officer.23
If the government believed that a parolee had violated the conditions of release, it
could seek a determination from a parole board to revoke parole and return the
individual to prison for part or all of the remaining time on the initial sentence. Parole
boards did not have to afford parolees anything like the rights associated with a
criminal trial before making a determination to revoke parole. In particular, parole
could be revoked on nothing more than a finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that individuals had violated the conditions of parole.24 Especially since re-imprisoned
parolees did not usually receive credit for the time while they were on parole, the
stakes at a parole hearing could be very high if the parolees were found to have
violated the conditions of release. Indeed, a parolee might face many years of
additional time in prison if found to have violated the conditions of release.
Nevertheless, despite the stakes, the determination was made by an executive body
without affording the protections that the accused would face at a criminal trial. Nor
was revocation of parole uncommon, as approximately 40% of parolees were returned
to prison before completing the time on their period of parole.25
Parole became the dominant model of criminal justice during the twentieth
century. Most states adopted some version of a parole system early in the century, and
every state had adopted it by the middle of the century.26 Congress adopted parole for
the federal criminal system in 1910 in a form that was similar to the basic system
commonly used at the state level.27
By the 1970s, however, the drumbeat of opposition to parole was growing louder.
While criticism of parole took many forms, a particularly influential line of attack
centered on two principal claims: that parole gave rise to excessive uncertainty and
arbitrariness regarding the length of prison terms, and that it did not actually fulfill its
rehabilitative aims in any event.28 One reason these criticisms gained so much traction
was that they appealed to both sides of the political spectrum. Regarding the
indeterminacy of prison terms, for instance, liberals could stress the implications for
fairness and racial equality, while conservatives could decry the possibility for
criminals to evade adequate punishment.29 Observers also charged that the parole
22 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 196.
23 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972).
24 Horner, supra note 21, at 279.
25 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479.
26 McClendon, supra note 12, at 181.
27 Id.
28 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 189–90.
29 Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 991–95 (2013).
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system needlessly tied the period of supervision to the original prison term.30 That is,
no matter how clearly individuals’ behavior gave indications of rehabilitation, they
had to remain within the parole system until the end of the maximum amount of time
on the initial sentence. Conversely, individuals who showed no signs of rehabilitation
whatsoever could not be kept under any kind of supervision beyond the expiration of
the initial sentence.31
B. The Establishment of Supervised Release
Motivated in large part by the aim of addressing perceived drawbacks of the parole
system, Congress in 1984 replaced it with a new model that incorporated supervised
release as a means of maintaining official supervision over individuals after they were
freed from prison.32 Without abandoning the rehabilitative aspirations of parole, the
new system sought to foster a greater level of predictability and consistency regarding
the length of prison terms.33
To appreciate the distinctiveness of supervised release, it is helpful to recall the
basic logic of the parole system that it replaced. In parole, the initial sentence included
a maximum amount of time to be served in prison. An individual could be released
from prison prior to the end of that maximum term, perhaps after serving as little as
one third of that term. However, no matter when individuals were released from
prison, they were necessarily kept within the parole system until the passage of the
time remaining on their maximum sentence. To illustrate, suppose an individual was
sentenced to a maximum of ten years, and a parole board later authorized release after
five years. Assuming the parole was not later revoked, the individual would remain
on parole for the next five years, until completion of the time remaining on the original
sentence. In the parole system, then, while there was indeterminacy regarding how
much of the original ten-year sentence the individual would actually serve in prison,
there was certainty regarding the maximum amount of time that the individual could
serve in prison. Moreover, except in cases where parole was revoked without credit
for time served on parole, there was also certainty regarding the combined amount of
time that the individual would remain either in prison or on parole.
There are, to be sure, important similarities between parole and supervised release.
Like parole, supervised release applies only after individuals serve time in prison.34
Thus, neither parole nor supervised release have functioned as freestanding sentences.
In this respect, both parole and supervised release have been alternatives to probation,
the institution used for subjecting individuals to supervision without their necessarily
having first served time in confinement.35 Also like parole, individuals on supervised
release are subject to a variety of requirements upon which their continued freedom is
conditioned. The basic structural difference is that in supervised release individuals
30 Id. at 1017–18.
31 McClendon, supra note 12, at 182.
32 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
33 Doherty, supra note 29, at 959–60, 995.
34 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 196.
35 Doherty, supra note 29, at 998.
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are subjected to a period of conditional liberty after completion of the initial prison
term.36 Apart from the possibility of relatively small reductions for good behavior,
individuals serve the entire initial prison term. This is the feature of the new system
that was supposed to address the excessive indeterminacy that plagued the parole
system.37 Moreover, since a term of supervised release is something that a judge may
impose as an additional part of the sentence to follow completion of the prescribed
prison term,38 it may be tailored to the particular circumstances of the individual
defendant rather than being tied simply to the length of the initial prison term.39 In
response to criticisms of parole’s reliance on quasi-judicial bodies based in the
executive branch, another change affected by the new system was that it moved
oversight of released individuals to the judiciary.
The statutory provisions introducing supervised release at the federal level were
part of a larger package of congressional legislation—the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984—that instituted broader changes in criminal justice.40 Those
broader changes included the establishment of the United States Sentencing
Commission, which was charged with producing guidelines to be used by judges in
determining sentences in particular cases.41 Within the outer ranges of penalties called
for by existing criminal law, the guidelines produced by the Sentencing Commission
provided criteria establishing narrower ranges for judges to use in fixing sentences.42
Under this new sentencing system, along with setting the length of the prison term that
an individual would serve, judges were also authorized to impose periods of
supervised release to be served following release from prison.43 For some offenses, a
minimum term of supervised release is required by statute.44 In other cases, judges
have discretion to impose terms of supervised release up to the statutorily provided
maximum.45 In making a determination about supervised release, judges are instructed
to consider a range of factors, including, for instance, the nature of the offense and the
defendant’s record.46 However, one factor that judges are specifically prohibited from
considering is the need to impose on defendants the just punishment they deserve for

36 Id. at 997.
37 Id. at 996.
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
39 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 190.
40 McClendon, supra note 12, at 181–82, 181 n.43.
41 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 190.
42 Id. at 193.
43 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000).
44 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 192.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 193.
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having engaged in the criminal activity.47 The rationale for this proscription is that the
guiding aim of supervised release is not to punish perpetrators, but rather, to pave the
way for their reintegration into society.48
Some of the conditions imposed on individuals during their supervised release are
mandatory for particular offenses, while others may be imposed at the judge’s
discretion depending on the details of particular cases.49 The Sentencing Guidelines
established by the Sentencing Commission speak not only to terms of imprisonment
but also to the imposition of supervised release. In cases involving felonies, for
instance, the Guidelines call for at least one year of supervised release, and they
recommend certain standard conditions governing matters such as the people with
whom defendants may associate.50 Judges also have discretion to impose a wide range
of other conditions, ranging from the submission of DNA samples to travel
restrictions, curfews, and limitations on the defendant’s place of employment.51
A crucial similarity with parole is that individuals on supervised release may be
re-imprisoned for violating the conditions of their liberty without being afforded the
usual constitutional protections of a criminal trial. This was not the intention from the
beginning. Since the purpose of supervised release was rehabilitation rather than
punishment—and supervised release was supposed to operate very differently from
parole—the language of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required a conventional
prosecution before re-imprisoning an individual on supervised release.52 Thus, under
the system as initially conceived, the government would have to use contempt of court
as a remedy for individuals who violated the conditions of their release, which required
the government to prove its allegations to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Before
the legislation took effect, however, intervening legislation (the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986) made a critical change: individuals on supervised release could be reimprisoned—potentially for longer periods of time than was remaining on their term
of supervised release—based on nothing more than the finding of a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated conditions of release.54
Later legislation (in 1994) allowed judges upon revocation to add new terms of
supervised release, in some cases even for the rest of the defendant’s life.55
While defendants at revocation hearings enjoy some procedural protections, such
as the rights to counsel, to testify on direct examination, and to be apprised of the
evidence, they are deprived of many of the basic protections normally associated with
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 624, 696–97 (2000).
50 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 192, 196–97.
51 Id. at 193, 197.
52 Id. at 190.
53 Id. at 191.
54 Doherty, supra note 29, at 1000–03.
55 Id. at 1003–04.
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a criminal trial. Not only are they denied the right to a jury and the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard, defendants at revocation hearings also do not
enjoy the protections of the exclusionary rule,56 the privilege against selfincrimination,57 or the Federal Rules of Evidence.58 Moreover, they are denied the
protection of the right not to be prosecuted twice for the same offense, which means
that defendants who have their supervised release revoked for acts that constitute
crimes may also be subject to a separate criminal prosecution.59 The position of
individuals in revocation hearings to mount a defense is also weakened by the
deprivation of rights that would normally apply prior to the stage at which the
prosecution presents its case. For instance, the conditions attached to supervised
release often include provisions allowing supervising officers to conduct searches
without procuring a warrant or establishing probable cause.60
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ON
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Despite the differences between parole and supervised release, we have seen that
there are many similarities. An especially significant thread of continuity concerns the
possibility that an individual may be re-imprisoned without anything close to the
normal procedural protections associated with a criminal trial. While sending
individuals to prison—potentially for long periods of time, and even up to terms of
life—without a jury trial or other constitutional protections, might seem extraordinary,
the practice has, in fact, long been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In this Part, we
consider the reasoning that the Court has used to uphold the practice.
As we will see, the crucial idea in the Court’s reasoning has been the drawing of a
distinction between the imposition of a sentence, on the one hand, and developments
that are part of the administration of a sentence already imposed, on the other. It is
uncontroversial that before the government imposes a new criminal sentence, it must
provide defendants with the full panoply of procedural protections guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution. According to the Justices’ reasoning, however, the revocation of
supervised release does not amount to the imposition of a new criminal sentence.
Rather, the Justices have reasoned, the revocation of supervised release should be
understood as a stage in the carrying out of a sentence previously established. If a
sentence is imposed only one time, then the government must afford the full panoply
of constitutional protections only once.

56 The Supreme Court has long held that evidence acquired in violation of the Constitution
may not be used to convict defendants in criminal cases. Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 383,
398 (1914).
57 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “No person shall be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58 Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha & Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 288
(1996).
59 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “No person shall be . . .
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 203–04.
60 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 202–03.
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A. Morrissey v. Brewer
Ironically, the most significant decision in which the Court articulated the
justification underlying the diminished rights of parolees—Morrissey v. Brewer61—
was one that set limits on the revocation of parole. By the time of that decision, the
notion that parolees did not enjoy the constitutional rights normally associated with a
criminal trial was so deeply entrenched that the defendants in the case did not even
advance the argument that they should have been granted a jury trial.62 Instead, the
issue before the Court was whether parolees were entitled to any kind of hearing at all
before being returned to prison for violating the conditions of their release.63
The named defendant, John Morrissey, had been convicted on charges of issuing
fraudulent checks and sentenced to a maximum prison term of seven years.64 The
parole board released Morrissey during the second year of imprisonment, but revoked
his parole seven months later.65 The board’s decision to revoke was based on the parole
officer’s report that Morrissey had violated the terms of his release in a number of
ways, including: purchasing a car under an assumed name; operating the car without
permission; giving false statements to police following a minor vehicular accident;
and failing to disclose his place of residence to his parole officer.66 The lower courts
in the case held that there was no constitutional deficiency in the parole board’s
decision to revoke Morrissey’s parole based on nothing more than the parole officer’s
report.67 The Constitution, they held, did not entitle the defendant to any kind of
hearing before his parole could be revoked.68 The Supreme Court overturned the lower
courts, declaring that parolees were entitled to a hearing before being returned to
prison.69 At the same time, the Justices had little difficulty in concluding that parolees
were not entitled to the rights associated with a jury trial.
Courts often confront questions about which procedural rights apply in various
contexts, since not every instance in which public officials render decisions impacting
the liberty or interests of individuals brings into play the full panoply of procedural
protections described in the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have the
61 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972).
62 See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (No. 71-5103).
63 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 472–73.
67 Id. at 474.
68 Id. at 474–75.
69 Id. at 489.
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Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”70 Not every encounter with government power
implicates all of these rights because not every encounter with government power is a
criminal prosecution. Even when not being criminally prosecuted, though, individuals
may nevertheless be entitled to certain procedural protections. The basis of such rights
is the Due Process Clause, which guarantees that: “No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”71 To determine which
procedural protections apply in a particular context, the Supreme Court has long held
that courts must engage in a balancing analysis that takes into account the interests
both of the individual and of the government.72
Morrissey is best known for the Court’s application of a balancing analysis under
the Due Process Clause to determine that parole could not be revoked without any
kind of hearing at all.73 In conducting that balancing analysis, Chief Justice Warren
Burger’s opinion for the Court acknowledged the considerable liberty interests at stake
for the parolee:
The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to
persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The parolee has been
released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable
promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, selfreliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully
employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him
to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very
different from that of confinement in a prison. He may have been on parole
for a number of years and may be living a relatively normal life at the time
he is faced with revocation. The parolee has relied on at least an implicit
promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole
conditions. In many cases, the parolee faces lengthy incarceration if his
parole is revoked. We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.74
Thus, the Court recognized that parolees have a strong interest in receiving some
kind of process beyond the mere filing of a report by the parole officer. At the same
time, the Court also stressed the government’s interest in being able to revoke parole
without having to provide parolees with overly burdensome procedural protections. In
this vein, Chief Justice Burger wrote:

70 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71 This is language of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment—applicable against the state governments rather than the federal
government—similarly guarantees that: “No state . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970).
73 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481–84.
74 Id. at 482.
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The State has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That
finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the individual’s liberty.
Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able
to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. Given the
previous conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has an
overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment
without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to
abide by the conditions of his parole.75
Taking into account the interests of both the parolee and the government, the Court
concluded that the parolee was entitled to an “effective but informal hearing.”76 More
specifically, the Court held that parolees were entitled, first, to a preliminary hearing,
and then to a revocation hearing.77 The preliminary hearing would entail a minimal
inquiry shortly after arrest “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable
ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a
violation of parole conditions.”78 At the preliminary hearing, the defendant was
entitled to notice of the basis for the government’s pursuit of revocation and an
opportunity to be heard.79 The hearing officer—who could be a parole officer, though
not the one directly involved in the case under litigation—was required to provide a
summary of the information that was the basis for holding the individual until the
revocation hearing.80 Within a reasonable time following the preliminary hearing—
the Court did not fix a minimum period but indicated that two months would normally
be a reasonable time frame—the defendant was entitled to a revocation hearing at
which he would be afforded such rights as “written notice of the claimed violations of
parole”; “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him”; an opportunity to present
evidence; and “a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers.”81
While the Court’s refusal to allow the revocation of parole without a hearing was
undoubtedly significant, the aspect of the decision with greatest salience for the
present discussion was the ease with which the Court concluded that parolees were
not entitled to a jury trial. The Court’s detailed balancing analysis was sandwiched
between insistences that parolees were clearly not entitled to jury trials before having
their parole revoked. Before commencing its weighing of individual and government
interests, Chief Justice Burger wrote: “We begin with the proposition that the
revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of

75 Id. at 483.
76 Id. at 485.
77 Id. at 485, 488.
78 Id. at 485.
79 Id. at 486–87.
80 Id. at 485–87.
81 Id. at 488–89.
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rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”82
Although the Court’s discussion on the point was brief, it made clear that the
unavailability of the full panoply of rights to parolees rested on two critical
distinctions. The first distinction was one already noted: that between the imposition
of a sentence, and its administration. If the revocation of parole constituted the
imposition of a new sentence, then it would bring with it the full panoply of procedural
protections. In the Court’s view, however, the revocation of parole merely represented
one development among many in the long course of events amounting to the
administration of a sentence already imposed.83
The second critical distinction was that between absolute and conditional liberty.
Absolute liberty was the liberty “to which every citizen is entitled”; this was the kind
of liberty enjoyed by all those who had not been convicted of crimes.84 By contrast,
parolees enjoyed only a “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special parole restrictions.”85 The two distinctions were interrelated. The first
distinction meant that parolees had already been afforded the full panoply of rights,
and, having been convicted, already had a sentence imposed. The second distinction
meant that part of the sentence imposed entailed a loss of liberty. Consequently,
parolees did not have as much at stake at a revocation hearing. The revocation of
parole did not entail a deprivation of absolute liberty because parolees had already lost
that kind of liberty when the sentencing court rendered its judgment.86
B. Johnson v. United States
Unlike parolees, individuals on supervised release have completed their prison
terms. This means that defendants who have their supervised release revoked are not
being returned to prison to complete a part of their initial prison term. Rather,
supervised release constitutes a separate component of a criminal sentence. The
maximum time that one may serve in prison following revocation of supervised release
is not fixed by the initial prison term, since that initial prison term has already been
fulfilled. In Johnson v. United States, however, the Court declined to find
constitutional significance in this difference in the structure of parole and supervised
release.87 As in Morrissey, the Court in Johnson based its reasoning in the distinction
between the imposition and administration of a sentence.88 According to the Court, the
revocation of supervised release—like the revocation of parole—was best understood

82 Id. at 480.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000).
88 See generally id.
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not as the imposition of a new sentence, but as a later development arising in the course
of administering a sentence already imposed.89
The immediate issue before the Court in Johnson concerned not the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial, but the Ex Post Facto Clause, set forth in Article I,
Section 9 of the Constitution (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).90 Upon
being convicted on charges of participating in a conspiracy to commit credit card fraud
in 1993, Cornell Johnson was sentenced to a prison term to be followed by three years
of supervised release.91 In 1994, after completing the prison term, Johnson had his
supervised release revoked based on allegations that he had engaged in acts of
forgery.92 In addition to a prison term, the district court imposed an additional term of
twelve months of supervised release following Johnson’s release from prison.93 At the
time of Johnson’s original offense in 1993, the existing legislation did not explicitly
authorize judges to impose new terms of supervised release when revoking an initial
term of supervised release. On appeal, Johnson contended that this imposition of a
new term of supervised release amounted to the unconstitutional application of an ex
post facto law.94
However, between the time of Johnson’s original sentence and the time of the acts
for which his supervised release was revoked in 1994, Congress had enacted
legislation unambiguously authorizing courts to impose new terms of supervised
release upon revoking a previous term of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the district court on the grounds that its revocation order imposed
a new punishment on Johnson.95 If the revocation order was a new punishment, then
the imposition of an additional term of supervised release was authorized by the
recently enacted congressional legislation, which took effect prior to the acts that were
the cause for the revocation.96
With respect to the immediate dispute, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling favored the
government, since it rejected Johnson’s challenge to the district court’s imposition of
a new term of supervised release.97 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning had
far-reaching implications that the government did not view so favorably. The Supreme
Court’s earlier conclusion in Morrissey that parolees were not entitled to jury trials
had hinged on the critical move of viewing the revocation of parole as nothing more
than the administration of a sentence already imposed. This idea was pivotal because
if the revocation of parole instead amounted to the imposition of a new prison term,
89 Id. at 700.
90 Id. at 696.
91 Id. at 697.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 698.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 698–99.
96 Id.
97 United States v. Johnson, No. 98-5664, 1999 WL 282679, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999).
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then parolees would have to be recognized as the accused in a criminal prosecution,
thereby bringing into play the complete array of constitutional protections. Now, in
Johnson, if the Sixth Circuit was right that revocation should be viewed as punishment
for actions that individuals committed while on supervised release—rather than as part
of the administration of the initial sentence—then this would mean that defendants at
revocation hearings would be entitled to the full panoply of rights associated with
criminal trials. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, if accepted, would block the Court from
applying the reasoning it used in Morrissey to the context of supervised release. Aware
of these implications, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the government disowned the
Sixth Circuit’s line of reasoning, arguing that the district court’s ruling should be
upheld on other grounds.98
In Johnson, the Supreme Court granted the government what it sought both with
respect to Johnson’s particular case and with respect to the larger issues raised by the
case. It found alternative grounds for denying Johnson’s Ex Post Facto Clause
challenge (including that earlier congressional legislation, enacted prior even to
Johnson’s initial sentence, had already effectively authorized the imposition of new
terms of supervised release).99 Of much broader significance, the Justices also rejected
the Sixth Circuit’s understanding of supervised release. In his opinion for the Court,
Justice David Souter focused on what the implications would be of accepting the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning. Indeed, Justice Souter articulated a justification for treating the
revocation of supervised release as punishment for the original offense that depended
entirely on what it saw as the undesirable consequences of failing to do so.100 In effect,
the Court treated the diminished constitutional rights of individuals on supervised
release as a fixed premise around which all other reasoning would have to be fitted.
Thus, in a remarkably terse statement addressing the (diminished) procedural
protections for individuals on supervised release at revocation hearings, Justice Souter
wrote:
While [the Sixth Circuit’s] understanding of revocation of supervised release
has some intuitive appeal, the Government disavows it, and wisely so in view
of the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by construing
revocation and re-imprisonment as punishment for the violation of the
conditions of supervised release. Although such violations often lead to reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal and need only be
found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the acts of violation are criminal in
their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were
also punishment for the same offense. Treating postrevocation sanctions as
part of the penalty for the initial offense, however (as most courts have done),
avoids these difficulties.101

98 Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700.
99 Id. at 704–07.
100 Id. at 700.
101 Id.
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In other words, recognizing revocation of supervised release as the imposition of
a new punishment would mean that the practice of affording dramatically diminished
rights to individuals would violate numerous constitutional protections. The unstated
premise driving Justice Souter’s reasoning was that such a result was plainly
unacceptable. Since adopting the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning would lead to this
(unacceptable) result, it had to be incorrect. Accordingly, the Court made explicit that
individuals on supervised release could be re-imprisoned without being afforded the
right to a jury trial and other rights normally provided at criminal trials.
C. United States v. Haymond
Following Johnson, almost two decades passed before the Court, in United States
v. Haymond, revisited the question of whether individuals were entitled to a jury trial
before having their supervised release revoked.102 For two major reasons, the
implications of Haymond for the rights of individuals on supervised release are less
clear than they were in Johnson. First, Haymond did not yield a majority opinion, and
second, Haymond set some (though, as we will see, quite limited) limitations on the
government’s ability to revoke supervised release without a jury trial.103 Despite
disagreements on the Court regarding certain issues in Haymond, however, all of the
Justices accepted certain basic assumptions which have long undergirded the
justification for according diminished rights to individuals convicted of crimes after
they are freed from prison.
Upon being convicted on charges of possession of child pornography, Andre
Haymond was sentenced to a 38-month prison term, to be followed by ten years of
supervised release.104 The crime for which Haymond was convicted provided for a
range of prison time between zero and ten years and a term of supervised release
between five years and life.105 While Haymond was on supervised release, the
government sought his re-imprisonment based on allegations that he had been found
once again in the possession of child pornography.106 After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court judge found for the government.107 On appeal, Haymond did not
challenge the system of supervised release as a whole, but rather, a statutory provision
that directly and significantly impacted his case: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).108 In the absence
of this provision, the district court judge would have exercised discretion in sentencing
Haymond to a term of imprisonment between zero and two years. In 2006, however,
as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Congress enacted §
3583(k), requiring the judge in a case like Haymond’s to impose a term of at least five

102 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2019).
103 Id. at 2371, 2378–79.
104 Id. at 2373.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2374.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2375.
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years (and up to a term of life).109 The provision applied in cases where an individual
who was required to register as a sex offender committed a crime punishable by more
than one year in prison.110 On appeal, Haymond claimed that § 3583(k) violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by subjecting him to a new sentence without a jury
trial.111 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, as did a majority of the Justices.112
By finding § 3583(k) unconstitutional as applied in Haymond’s case, the Court set
limitations on the extent to which individuals on supervised release could be reimprisoned without a jury trial. Nevertheless, examination of the Court’s reasoning
reveals that, notwithstanding their disagreements, the Court as a whole kept intact the
basic assumptions that have long justified the government in providing only secondtier rights to individuals who are under some kind of supervision following release
from prison. Thus, it is vital to recognize the extent of the agreement among the
Justices in Haymond. Most significantly, Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion, like
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, accepted the basic approach that the Court had long
used to uphold the extension of only second-tier rights to individuals on parole or
supervised release. Indeed, the reasoning on which the plurality relied to invalidate §
3583(k) depended on that crucial distinction between the imposition and
administration of a sentence.113 As Justice Gorsuch wrote: “The defendant receives a
term of supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and whether that release is later
revoked or sustained, it constitutes a part of the final sentence for his crime.”114
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the four dissenting Justices found it easy to
conclude that Haymond’s constitutional challenge lacked merit. 115 According to the
dissent, nothing more was required to decide Haymond than a straightforward
application of the same reasoning that earlier Justices had used to justify the
affordance of only second-tier rights to parolees.116 In Justice Alito’s view, the Court’s
precedents in Morrissey and Johnson were enough to decide the case.117 As discussed
above, Morrissey employed the distinction between the imposition and administration
of a sentence to explain why parolees were not entitled to jury trials before being reimprisoned.118 Justice Alito asserted that the same distinction applied to individuals

109 Id. at 2374–75.
110 Id. at 2374 n.1.
111 Id. at 2375.
112 Id. at 2371, 2375, 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 2380 (plurality opinion).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2386–2400 (Alito, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2393–94.
117 Id. at 2394.
118 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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on supervised release.119 Drawing on the Court’s reasoning in Morrissey, Justice Alito
maintained that revocation of supervised release had to be understood not as
punishment for a new offense, but rather, as part of the ongoing administration of the
punishment for the initial offense.120 According to this line of reasoning, when
individuals on supervised release received penalties following revocation hearings,
they were not being punished for newly committed offenses. Instead, the “principal
reason for assigning a penalty to a supervised-release violation is . . . that the violative
act is a breach of trust.”121 Thus, even when the allegations leading to revocation of
supervised release were criminal in nature, the defendant was “charged not with a
crime, but with violating the terms of a jury-authorized sentence that flowed from his
original conviction.”122 Justice Alito argued that this justification for re-imprisonment
without a jury trial, transplanted from the context of parole, had no less force in the
context of supervised release.123 He also emphasized just how far this line of reasoning
reached: even a defendant subjected to a relatively brief prison term at the initial
sentence could be subjected to a long term of re-imprisonment without a jury trial.124
As Justice Alito put the point: “No matter what penalties flow from the revocation of
parole . . . the related proceedings are not part of the criminal prosecution.”125
The central difference between the plurality and dissenting Justices concerned the
former’s view that a line of cases tracing to Apprendi v. New Jersey126 applied to
Haymond’s case. Apprendi arose as a judicial response to an important development
in sentencing policy that had been implemented in the 1980s. In particular, legislatures
had adopted a bifurcated approach to sentencing.127 Following the return of a guilty
verdict, judges engaged in a second phase during which they considered factors
bearing on an appropriate punishment before determining the sentence.128 The practice
was rendered potentially problematic when legislators began authorizing judges to
increase sentences based on particular findings regarding the nature of the defendant’s
criminal behavior. These “sentencing enhancement” provisions raised constitutional
questions because they increased the possible range of penalties based on findings that

119 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2394 (Alito, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2393–94.
121 Id. at 2393.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 2394.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2379; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000).
127 McClendon, supra note 12, at 189.
128 Id.
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did not have to be established in accordance with the same procedural protections
associated with the phase of the trial aimed at determining guilt.129
The defendant in Apprendi was convicted on charges of unlawfully possessing a
firearm.130 In itself, that conviction subjected Charles Apprendi to a prison term of
five to ten years.131 However, under New Jersey’s hate crime law, Apprendi would be
subject to a term of ten to twenty years if he was found to have committed the
underlying crime “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”132
Crucially, while the underlying offense had to be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt”
to a jury, the facts giving rise to the sentencing enhancement only had to be
demonstrated to a judge by a “preponderance of the evidence.”133 Finding that the
sentencing enhancement applied, the judge in Apprendi’s case sentenced him to a
twelve-year prison term, which was more than the maximum to which he could have
been subjected in the absence of the sentencing enhancement.134 The Court invalidated
the state’s sentencing enhancement scheme, declaring: “Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”135 Courts had long held the prosecution to the burden of proving every element
of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.136 What Apprendi declared was that
this requirement also applied to features of a crime that had the effect of increasing
the penalties to which a defendant was subjected.137
While Apprendi applied to features of a crime that increased the maximum sentence
to which a defendant could be subjected, in Alleyne v. United States,138 the Court
applied the same reasoning 13 years later to features of a crime that increased the
minimum sentence. Overruling its contrary conclusion in Harris v. United States,139
Alleyne established that features of a crime that increased the floor of the punishment
brought into play the same constitutional protections applicable to features of a crime
raising the ceiling.140 As Justice Thomas wrote in his opinion for the majority:
129 Id. at 190.
130 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
131 Id. at 470.
132 Id. at 468–69.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 471.
135 Id. at 490.
136 Id. at 476–77.
137 Id. at 468–83.
138 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).
139 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568–69 (2002).
140 Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103.
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Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an “element” that
must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows,
then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an “element” that
must be submitted to the jury.141
The difference between facts increasing the maximum or the minimum did not
make a constitutional difference because “[b]oth kinds of facts alter the prescribed
range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that
aggravates the punishment.”142
Because the statute at issue in Haymond imposed a mandatory minimum sentence,
it was Alleyne in particular that the plurality stressed in defending its decision to
invalidate § 3583(k).143 To find Alleyne applicable, the plurality had to embrace the
view of revocation as tying back to the initial sentence, rather than as imposing a new
sentence. Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning was that the minimum sentence mandated by §
3583(k) altered the range of penalties to which Haymond was subject.144
Notwithstanding the passage of substantial time between the initial sentence and the
revocation hearing, the analogy with a mandatory term imposed at the time of the
initial sentence held firm.145 In the plurality’s view, the passage of time did not alter
the essential nature of § 3583(k).146 What it effected was clear: it altered the prescribed
range of sentence to which Haymond was exposed, and it did so in a way that
aggravated the punishment. In particular, instead of having the possibility of being
sentenced to no prison time at all—which would have been the case in the absence of
§ 3583(k)—the statute subjected Haymond to a minimum sentence of five years. In
light of this clear change in the prescribed range of penalties, the plurality reasoned,
Haymond was entitled to have the facts supporting the finding of guilt proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.147
In relying on Alleyne to invalidate § 3583(k), the plurality stressed that it was
accepting the Court’s longstanding view that the revocation of supervised release did
not constitute punishment for a new offense.148 Insisting that the opinion did nothing
more than apply existing doctrines, Justice Gorsuch wrote that “an accused’s final
sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may receive.”149 Thus, the

141 Id.
142 Id. at 108.
143 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2374, 2382 (2019).
144 Id. at 2378.
145 Id. at 2382.
146 Id. at 2379.
147 Id. at 2378.
148 Id. at 2379–80.
149 Id. at 2379.
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plurality opinion was not “say[ing] anything new.”150 Crucially, the plurality and
dissenting Justices were in agreement that revocation did not represent punishment for
a new offense. The question on which they disagreed was whether revocation should
be seen as an extension of the initial sentencing or merely a facet of the administration
of a sentence that was already finally determined. Since the plurality saw revocation
as an extension of the sentencing linked to the initial trial, it brought with it
constitutional protections associated with that phase of the proceedings. By contrast,
the dissent considered the determination of the initial sentence to be completed and
closed at the time of the initial sentencing, which brought to an end the period when
those constitutional protections applied.151 Whether or not the dissenting Justices were
right to fear the positions that the plurality Justices might adopt in future cases,152 the
plurality’s reasoning did not overthrow the basic assumptions on which the Court’s
approach to revocation hearings have rested up to this point.
To be sure, in contrast to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion—which emphasized
the similarities between parole and supervised release153—the plurality’s reasoning
noted a distinction between parole and supervised release. But the role that this
distinction played in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was effectively to note that the
particular issue before the Court in Haymond just could not have arisen in the context
of parole. After all, in the parole system, the sentencing judge set the range of prison
time that defendant might serve, leaving the possibility of early release up to the parole
board. Consequently, parole revocation hearings simply did not entail the possibility
that the range of possible penalties could be altered at the revocation hearing. By
contrast, in the current system, the defendant completes the prison term imposed at the
initial sentence before beginning the term of supervised release. This means that the
revocation of supervised release can result in the defendant serving more prison time
than was prescribed at the time of the initial sentence. What the plurality found
unacceptable about § 3583(k) was that its mandatory minimum altered the range of
prison time to which the defendant was subject, an outcome that would have been
precluded under a parole system by its very structure.154 The important point is that
the distinction that the plurality drew between parole and supervised release did not
upset the longstanding assumption that in both systems the government’s attempt to
re-imprison defendants did not amount to the imposition of a new sentence.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer indicated that he largely agreed with the
understanding of the revocation of supervised release adopted in Justice Alito’s
dissenting opinion.155 In nevertheless deeming § 3583(k) unconstitutional, Justice
Breyer identified two key problems with the provision’s mandatory minimum
sentence: it picked out specific crimes that triggered its application, and it interfered

150 Id.
151 Id. at 2395 (Alito, J., dissenting).
152 Id.
153 See id. at 2391.
154 Id. at 2381–82 (plurality opinion).
155 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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with judicial discretion.156 While Justice Breyer’s brief opinion did not spell out the
basis for its conclusion in the same detail as the plurality and dissenting opinions, we
can best understand its reasoning by recalling the roots of the practice of reimprisoning individuals without jury trials. As we have seen, that practice has
depended on a rehabilitative conception of conditional liberty. The goal of overseeing
individuals conditionally released from prison is to reform and reintegrate them into
society. When individuals violate the conditions of release, they breach the trust that
was placed in them. Re-imprisonment constitutes a response to that breach of trust,
not a new punishment for the commission of a particular crime. It is this conception
of supervised release that underlies the notion that re-imprisonment amounts to the
administration of an existing sentence rather than the imposition of a new one. Justice
Breyer’s opinion seemed to express the view that § 3583(k) could not be made to
plausibly fit with this model. A rehabilitative framework depends on the judge holding
discretion to fit consequences to a particular defendant’s situation, rather than
imposing mandatory sentences. Moreover, § 3583(k)’s selection of particular crimes
for mandatory minimum punishments suggested that its real focus was not so much
on rehabilitation as it was on punishing crimes seen as presenting an especially
pressing societal problem. It is notable in this respect that the provision challenged in
Haymond was not enacted as part of a bill principally geared toward improving the
system of supervised release. Rather, as stated in the legislation’s preamble, the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (of which § 3583(k) constituted only a
relatively small portion) was designed to “protect children from sexual exploitation
and violent crime” and “to prevent child abuse and child pornography . . . .”157 Again,
the most important point for our purposes is that Justice Breyer, like the rest of the
Court, did not challenge the pivotal distinction between the imposition and
administration of a sentence in justifying the practice of re-imprisonment without a
jury trial. His objection was not to the general framework that the Court has long
applied, but to the challenged statute’s failure to fit neatly within that framework.
IV. THE UNJUSTIFIABILITY OF RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL
In this Part, we turn from description of the justification that the Court has offered
for the practice of re-imprisonment without a jury trial to criticism of that justification.
The linchpin of the justification has been to conceive of the revocation of supervised
release as part of the punishment for the original offense, rather than as punishment
for a new offense. If revocation does not constitute punishment for a new offense,
then, under well-established constitutional doctrines, individuals on supervised release
are not entitled to the full panoply of procedural protections associated with a criminal
trial. But what if the claim that revocation does not constitute punishment for a new
offense is exposed as an unwarranted legal fiction? If the claim is not valid, then we
must recognize that a large population of individuals conducting full lives outside of
prison are being systematically deprived of the most basic constitutional protections.
It is vital to recognize what is at stake in assessing the justification for reimprisonment without a jury trial. The practice has been widely accepted for so long
that it may be easy to overlook how remarkable it is. Ordinarily, we take it for granted

156 Id. at 2386.
157 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
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that individuals are entitled to the full panoply of procedural rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. One of the most cherished of these is the right to a jury trial for those
accused of a crime. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused in “all criminal
prosecutions shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury”
embodies a commitment to liberty and self-government.158 No exercise of
governmental power more immediately restricts individual liberty than a prosecution
resulting in imprisonment. One of the ways that the Constitution sets bounds on the
exercise of that power is by placing the judgment of the people—in the form of a jury
verdict—between the government and the individual charged with a crime.
Another one of the most familiar and cherished rights is that the government has
the burden of proving every element of a charged offense “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”159 Although this right is not stated explicitly in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has long recognized it as implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”160
In the 1968 decision declaring this as a firmly entrenched constitutional right—In re
Winship—the Court explained the indispensability of this right in protecting
individual liberty.161 Justice William Brennan’s opinion for the Court emphasized the
stakes for a defendant in a criminal trial, the power differential between the defendant
and the prosecution, and the role that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard has in
protecting individuals from erroneous convictions.162 As Justice Brennan noted, the
defendant “has at stake interest[s] of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”163 Like all human institutions,
criminal prosecutions are fallible. No one is immune from the possibility that one’s
liberty could be taken away due to an erroneous verdict. In Justice Brennan’s words:
“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which
both parties must take into account.”164 However, while the defendant and the state
both are affected by an erroneous verdict, the impact is not equivalent. Because a
guilty verdict potentially takes individuals away from virtually every aspect of their
normal lives, what the defendant has at stake is “an interest of transcending value.”165
Moreover, the resources of the two sides in the adversarial proceedings are hardly on

158 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
159 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (“The requirement that guilt of a
criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early
years as a Nation.”).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362–63.
161 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
162 Id. at 363–64.
163 Id. at 363.
164 Id. at 364.
165 Id.
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a similar scale. The accused is “at a severe disadvantage.”166 For these reasons, it is
crucial to protect the defendant by requiring the government to prove the elements of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the power imbalance between the
parties, it would “amount[] to a lack of fundamental fairness if [the defendant] could
be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as
would suffice in a civil case.”167 The beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard
“provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.”168
The Court’s language in Winship stressed the fundamental nature of the reasonable
doubt standard. For instance, Justice Brennan referred to the nation’s longstanding
commitment to this right as “reflect[ing] a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered.”169 In a similar vein, he referred to
the “vital role” that the reasonable doubt standard “plays . . . in the American scheme
of criminal procedure,”170 stating that “[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error.”171 Indeed, the standard is “indispensable, for
it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude
of the facts in issue.’”172 Moreover, because of its importance to the balance of power
between individuals and government, the reasonable doubt standard shapes the way
that individuals conduct their lives, and their relationship with the instruments of
official authority. As Justice Brennan wrote in Winship: “It is . . . important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”173 Enforcing the guarantee reflects
a judgment about the value that a society places on individuals’ liberty, and their
overriding interest in not being subjected to unjust treatment, as “a society that values
the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”174
The recent case in which the Court addressed the practice of re-imprisonment
without a jury trial—United States v. Haymond—provides an excellent example of the
concrete impact that the applicable evidentiary burden has on individual cases. As
discussed above, while Haymond was on supervised release, the government sought
revocation and re-imprisonment based on allegations that he had knowingly been in
166 Id. at 363.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 361–62.
170 Id. at 363.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 364.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 363–64.
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possession of child pornography.175 Employing the “preponderance of the evidence
standard” that has long been applied in revocation hearings, the district court found
against Haymond, and, thus, under § 3583(k), had no choice but to sentence him to at
least five years in prison.176 As described by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
ruling on Haymond’s appeal, the evidence validly admitted during the hearing showed
that there were thirteen images of child pornography on Haymond’s cell phone.177 The
dispute concerned whether Haymond had known about the images or had taken any
intentional actions to acquire them. The only expert who testified at the hearing
indicated that there were several plausible ways that the images could have ended up
on Haymond’s phone without his knowledge, and there was no definitive evidence
regarding whether Haymond had ever viewed the images.178 In the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, the evidence against Haymond presented “a close case, even under
a preponderance of the evidence standard,” although it ultimately concluded that the
evidence was sufficient under that standard.179 The case strikingly illustrates the
significance of the evidentiary burden, because the evidence would have been
nowhere close to supporting a finding of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In light of the tremendous importance of the right to a jury trial, a reasonable doubt
standard of evidence, and other basic constitutional protections, we should recognize
the practice of re-imprisoning individuals without affording such protections as a
remarkable departure that demands the strongest of justifications. We have seen that
the justification, as explained by the Court, turns on the conception of revocation as
punishment for the original offense. Unfortunately, that conception does not hold up
to scrutiny.
Individuals on supervised release can be re-imprisoned based on a wide variety of
allegations, ranging from failing to comply with reporting requirements to the
commission of grave crimes. When the government seeks re-imprisonment, the
outcome is decided through a process of adversarial litigation presided over by a judge.
The revocation hearing is aimed at determining whether the defendant is guilty of the
acts alleged by the government. Based on a finding of guilt, individuals previously
freed from prison may be returned to prison, potentially for the rest of their lives. For
defendants at revocation hearings, it is difficult to overstate how much rides on the
outcome.
To highlight the potential stakes, consider the situation of an individual who is
serving a period of supervised release following a short prison term for a relatively
minor crime. While on supervised release, the individual has been living lawfully, but
the supervising officer inaccurately comes to believe that the individual has engaged
in serious criminal activity. Let us assume that the officer who makes the allegations
has nothing but good intentions and has simply made observations that lend
175 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019).
176 United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201, 2016 WL 4094886, at *7 (N.D. Okla. Aug.
2, 2016). The judge in fact imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of five years, to be
followed by ten more years of supervised release. Id. at *1.
177 United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2017).
178 Id. at 1157–58.
179 Id. at 1159.
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themselves to an erroneous interpretation of events. Of course, misimpressions,
mistakes, and misjudgments happen all the time. In itself, there is nothing remarkable
about a person in an official position arriving at a mistaken impression even with
nothing but the intention to serve the demands of justice. Normally, however, an
individual suspected of wrongdoing would be protected from error by the rigorous
demands that the right to a jury trial and reasonable doubt standard place on the
prosecution. Especially in a criminal justice system like that of the United States,
which is centered around the model of adversarial proceedings between the
government and the individual, protections for individuals depend on precisely how
the rules of the game are configured. While no system designed and run by fallible
human beings can be foolproof, the protections provided by the full panoply of
constitutional rights are robust. Prosecutors have little incentive to bring charges in
cases where the evidence suggests only a vague likelihood of the defendant’s guilt.
Even if they do choose to do so, the demands of proving every element of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt provide considerable protection from an unjust
outcome. These protections are supposed to reassure individuals that they are very
unlikely to end up in prison based on the bad luck of events producing a misimpression
of their guilt. The system promises those not on supervised release that it will, in the
most literal sense, give them the benefit of the doubt.
The situation is quite different for individuals on supervised release. To focus for
the moment on just one of the basic rights not available to them, the difference between
the “preponderance of the evidence” and “reasonable doubt” standards of evidence is
enormous. An individual on supervised release faces a dramatically heightened risk of
being unjustly prosecuted and re-imprisoned for acts that they did not commit. Just as
the incentives built into the American adversarial system work in favor of individuals
who enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights, they work decisively against
individuals on supervised release. As Justices have recognized both in the context of
parole and supervised release, prosecutors have every incentive to take advantage of
the opportunity to litigate cases without affording defendants the full panoply of
rights.180 As one commentator observes, given the professional guidelines bearing on
the work of federal prosecutors, they “would be faithfully following directions were
[they] to routinely choose revocations over trials.”181
In light of the stakes for defendants, including the possibility of being imprisoned
for long periods of time for acts they did not commit, the notion that revocation
amounts to nothing more than “administration” of a sentence already imposed for the
initial offense loses plausibility. It is worth emphasizing that individuals on supervised

180 See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972) (“Sometimes revocation occurs when
the parolee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the
procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”);
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2381 (“Instead of seeking a revocation of supervised release, the
government could have chosen to prosecute Mr. Haymond under a statute mandating a term of
imprisonment of 10 to 20 years for repeat child-pornography offenders. But why bother with an
old-fashioned jury trial for a new crime when a quick-and-easy ‘supervised release revocation
hearing’ before a judge carries a penalty of five years to life?” (citation omitted)).
181 Danny Zemel, Enforcing Statutory Maximums: How Federal Supervised Release Violates
the Sixth Amendment Rights Defined in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 965, 974
(2018).
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release may be imprisoned not only for the commission of crimes, but also for
violating conditions of their release that would not otherwise be wrongful, such as
consuming alcohol, or traveling without authorization. Reflecting on circumstances
that could more plausibly support the treatment of revocation as mere administration
of a previously imposed sentence further highlights why the theory is flawed as
presently applied. Let us consider a hypothetical program that will help us to recognize
particularly problematic features of supervised release as presently constructed. In this
imagined “afternoon release program,” incarcerated individuals are allowed to spend
brief intervals of time outside of prison. We can suppose that the program imposes
certain conditions on individuals participating in it. For instance, continued
involvement in the program depends on participants only going to places approved in
advance, and on reporting back to prison by the scheduled time. Now, let us envisage
a case in which the government alleges that a number of individuals violated the
conditions of their participation in the program; according to a supervising official,
these individuals visited unapproved locations and did not report back to prison in a
timely manner. These individuals deny the allegations and contend that they are
entitled to a jury trial with the full panoply of rights normally associated with such a
trial. In the litigation, the government contends that it should not be required to prove
the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before removing individuals from
the afternoon release program. In the government’s view, it does not constitute a new
criminal charge when individuals are removed from the program. It would be more
appropriate, the government argues, to conceive of the afternoon release program as
part of the administration of the individuals’ initial sentence. Thus, the removal of
individuals from the program, too, should be understood as part of the administration
of the initial sentence.
With respect to the hypothetical afternoon release program just described, the
government’s position regarding the inapplicability of the right to a jury trial and all
of the accompanying protections would be entirely reasonable. Of course, individuals
in the release program would still enjoy the protection of the Due Process Clause. It
may be that the requirements of due process would compel the government to provide
some kind of hearing or other process before removing individuals from the program.
But those kinds of questions would be governed by the balancing test endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly182 with the appropriate procedural requirements
determined based on a weighing of the interests at stake for both the individuals
involved and the government.
To continue with consideration of our hypothetical afternoon release program,
suppose now that evidence surfaces indicating that an inmate participating in the
program has committed a serious crime during one of the periods of release. If the
government wanted to seek an additional prison term for the individual based on the
newly committed crime, it clearly would not be appropriate for it to pursue this using
the same procedural machinery that was in place for removing individuals from the
afternoon release program. Instead, in such circumstances, it would be necessary for
the government to bring criminal charges in a new case in which the defendant would
unambiguously stand as the accused in a fresh criminal prosecution. As such, the

182 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). As discussed above, in Goldberg, the
Court held that the government was required to provide a pretermination hearing before cutting
off the benefits of a welfare recipient. Id. at 263–64.
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defendant would be entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections that
accompanies such a prosecution.
It is helpful to contrast the first hypothetical case discussed above—where the
government seeks to diminish an individual’s participation in the afternoon release
program based on their failure to comply with the conditions—with cases in which the
government seeks to re-imprison an individual on supervised release. In the
hypothetical case, the government’s allegations concern the defendant’s participation
in the afternoon release program, and it is the defendant’s continued participation in
the program which will be at stake in the proceedings. The individual has failed to
comply with the requirements that comprise the administration of the program itself,
and, as a result, access to that program may be limited or denied. This makes it more
reasonable than in the context of supervised release to characterize the punishment
involved (“revocation” of the individual’s participation in the afternoon release
program) merely as part of the “administration” of a sentence that was previously
imposed. With respect to the revocation of supervised release, the potential
punishment is not cabined in the same manner. A defendant at a supervised release
revocation hearing potentially faces years of imprisonment—a punishment unrelated
to the administration of supervised release—for actions unrelated to the administration
of supervised release. To be sure, supervised release includes as a condition that
individuals do not commit crimes. The difficulty, however, concerns the extraordinary
breadth of this condition. It lacks a connection to the circumstances in which the
particular individual is serving the period of supervised release. Indeed, we are all
subject to the requirements of the criminal law. The difference, of course, is that most
people are entitled to the full slate of constitutional protections if we are accused of
crimes. It is one thing to withhold the usual constitutional protections in tweaking
details of the manner in which one serves a sentence for actions directly related to
those details (as in the case of disallowing individuals in the hypothetical to continue
participating in the afternoon release program because they did not return at the
appointed time). However, it is quite another to withhold the usual constitutional
protections in trying individuals on supervised release for alleged crimes despite their
having no connection to the manner in which the release is overseen.
Another significant difference between the hypothetical case and the revocation of
supervised release concerns the implications on individuals’ lives of depriving them
of basic procedural protections. Knowing that one might be officially sanctioned
without access to a reasonable doubt standard can have a chilling effect on one’s
behavior. People may alter their behavior to minimize the chances that they will be
sanctioned for acts that they did not actually commit. In contrast with the stringent
reasonable-doubt standard, the preponderance of the evidence standard requires the
prosecution only to show that it is slightly more likely than not that the defendant
committed the alleged acts. To cite just one illustrative example, suppose there is a
protest organized by a social organization in the downtown area of a city. An
individual who is sympathetic to the cause of the protesters and interested in political
events is weighing whether to attend. To what extent should the fear of being wrongly
accused of criminal acts relating to the protest be taken into account? The calculation
may well be different for an individual on supervised release than for one not subject
to the same deprivation of rights. The individual on supervised release knows that the
prosecution would face a relatively low evidentiary standard in any resulting trial. This
heightens the possibility of being convicted for a crime that the person did not commit.
If there are allegations, say, of theft, or the intentional destruction of property, an
individual on supervised release might choose to stay away from the protest for fear
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of being spotted in the vicinity of alleged crimes, which could be enough to encourage
prosecutors to pursue charges. However, an individual who enjoys the full slate of
constitutional protections might have substantially less to worry about in this regard,
since the prosecution would need much more convincing evidence to establish a
winning case. The chilling effect of diminished rights protections is more concerning
with respect to individuals on supervised release than it is with respect to individuals
in the afternoon release program. To minimize any chance of false allegations,
individuals in the afternoon release program might, say, return to the prison well
before the prescribed time, or avoid going even to some of the locations on the
approved list. While regrettable, the impact of this kind of behavioral self-censorship
is relatively limited; it affects inmates only with respect to their behavior during brief
periods of time during the course of their prison terms. By contrast, the impact of
diminished rights on individuals on supervised release is pervasive, since it applies to
their behavior at all times.
Focusing on stakes helps us to appreciate that the manner in which the term
“punishment” has been used in justifying revocation without a jury trial rings hollow.
The oft-repeated justification for the practice is that revocation is not meant as
punishment for acts committed following the initial sentence; the only punishment that
the individual is undergoing is that declared by the initial sentence. But it is worth
pausing to reflect on what is supposed to be conveyed by the term “punishment” in
this formulation. Is this supposed to be a reference to the purpose behind the harsh
treatment—imprisonment—that the individual is being compelled to endure? Surely,
individuals’ access to the Constitution’s protections cannot properly be thought to turn
on the label attached to the policy reason behind why an individual is being
imprisoned. Suppose the government announced at the initial prosecution that its aim
in seeking to put the defendant behind bars was not punishment at all but was simply
to offer the individual an opportunity for rehabilitation. This would not alter the
individuals’ access to constitutional protections. A new characterization of the same
harsh treatment would not change the constitutional landscape. What entitles
defendants to the full panoply of constitutional rights is the fact that the government
is making a bid to deprive them of their liberty in such a far-reaching manner. At a
revocation hearing, the government is seeking to do the same, and it is doing so on the
basis of specified acts that the defendant has allegedly committed a substantial period
of time after the initial sentence. That an individual on supervised release was afforded
the full set of constitutional protections before being found guilty of earlier acts should
not mean that they may be found guilty of entirely separate, later acts, without those
protections. Referring to the defendant’s potential re-imprisonment as
“administration” or “punishment for an earlier offense” hardly changes the essential
nature of the proceedings. The individual is being charged with having engaged in
particular behaviors, and, if found to have committed them may be subjected to time
in prison. Our system of criminal justice allows the government to put people in prison
for periods of time based on their misdeeds. That much is not controversial. However,
the Constitution provides a robust set of protections for individuals accused of crimes,
recognizing the stakes for defendants and the tremendous power imbalance between
defendants and the government within a system that pits parties against one another in
an adversarial contest. Defendants at revocations hearings deserve no less.
In response to the line of argument just advanced for distinguishing the afternoon
release program from supervised release, one might object that the supposed
difference described is really no difference at all. That is, it might be argued, just like
individuals in the afternoon release program, the liberty of individuals on supervised

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/6

30

2021]

RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL

599

release is subject to a number of conditions, including that they do not engage in
unlawful activities. However, while it is true that an individual in the afternoon release
program and an individual on supervised release both are subject to conditions, there
is a tremendous difference with respect to the consequences for being found to have
violated those conditions. What individuals in the afternoon release program have at
stake is access to that program for the remainder of their prison term. To be sure,
participation in the program may mean a good deal to individuals in the program.
Nevertheless, even if they are found to have violated the conditions of the program,
the worst consequences to which they are subject is that they will serve out the same
prison term to which they were initially sentenced without access to program that
makes completing the term somewhat less onerous. The difference between being in
prison with or without access to the program pales in comparison to the difference
between serving a prison term and being freed from prison. In contrast with individuals
in the afternoon release program, individuals on supervised release are not subject
only to the possibility of being denied access to a particular program during the course
of their existing sentence. Instead, they face the possibility of being removed from
their lives outside of prison and subjected to a newly prescribed prison term. These
are individuals conducting lives outside of prison, embedded in all of the same kinds
of aspects of a complete life as anyone else. What is at stake for them is not
participation in a program that makes time in prison a little more bearable, but
participation in a full life outside of prison. With stakes that high, to say that
individuals on supervised release are not entitled to the usual constitutional protections
because revocation constitutes mere “administration” of an existing sentence lacks
plausibility.
The conventional justification for revocation and re-imprisonment without a jury
trial emphasizes that individuals on supervised release enjoy only conditional liberty,
rather than the unconditional liberty enjoyed by others. It is true, of course, that the
criminal justice system is built on the idea that being convicted of a crime may result
in individuals’ loss of freedoms that they enjoyed prior to their conviction. Society
itself depends on the notion that communities may impose consequences for violation
of their established laws. It is also true that individuals on supervised release are
subjected to certain conditions as part of the consequences for their criminal
convictions. Just as serving time in prison is a pre-established possible consequence
for breaking the law, so too is serving a term of supervised release. And supervised
release, by its very nature, entails impositions on an individual’s freedom that they
would not incur had it not been for the criminal conviction that was the basis for their
sentence. Nevertheless, noting that supervised release entails certain conditions that
do not apply to the general population does not necessarily establish that any condition
whatsoever may be imposed. There are limits on what kinds of conditions may be
punitively imposed. A judge surely could not include as a condition of supervised
release that an individual work twenty hours a day, or that they become practitioners
of a religion they do not support. These might seem like silly examples because they
are so extreme, but what they illustrate is that invocation of the idea of “conditional
liberty” does not close off all possible questions regarding the acceptability of any
particular conditions that might be imposed as part of supervised release.
While there is surely a sense in which everyone on supervised release could be
said to enjoy only diminished rights as compared to others, not all states of diminished
rights are equivalent. It is one thing, say, to require individuals to report to a
supervising official at regular intervals, and it is quite another to deprive them of the
constitutional rights that guard against unjust convictions. As we have seen, the
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conventional justification for revocation without a jury trial works by emphasizing the
distinction between administration of the initial sentence and the imposition of a new
sentence. The pivotal move is to attribute new consequences imposed on defendants
to old acts committed by the defendants. If an individual was initially sentenced to a
year in prison at time zero, and then is re-imprisoned years later for a term of life, that
re-imprisonment is supposed to be understood as a development arising in the course
of administering the initial sentence. This way of framing supervised release has the
effect of blurring the distinction between all of the different kinds of freedoms that
individuals on supervised release find to be diminished or severely compromised. The
idea is that individuals on supervised release enjoy only conditional liberty, and the
unavailability of the right to a jury trial is just one more of the unfortunate but
foreseeable consequences for violating the law. However, we should recognize the
constitutional rights that protect us from unjust convictions as having a special
importance which makes it inappropriate to withhold them from individuals on
supervised release. The first reason is a theme we have already stressed: the stakes
involved for a defendant charged with crimes. Other components of supervised release
have limited scope and impact on the course of an individual’s life. They intrude on
one feature in the landscape of freedom while leaving others intact. For example, an
individual on supervised release might not be permitted to visit specified places or
may be required to notify authorities before changing one’s employment status. While
these and other conditions are not insubstantial, they leave large swaths of individuals’
lives untouched. By contrast, the right to a jury trial—and the associated procedural
protections—serve as a bulwark against being subjected unjustly to the most serious
criminal sentences. If these rights are severely compromised, then an individual may
be deprived of liberty in the most thoroughgoing manner through the imposition of an
additional prison term.
A point that is not unrelated to the stakes, but is conceptually distinct, concerns the
manner in which the current system reorders the relation between the most awesome
powers of government and the protection of individuals from the inappropriate use of
those powers. There is no aspect of government more fundamental to its role as the
guardian of peace and order than its authority to impose negative consequences on
individuals who violate the laws. This power may be indispensable to civilized society
as we know it, but it is also breathtaking in its scope. It means not merely that the
agencies of government have the capacity to deprive individuals of their liberty for the
remainder of their lives, but that one would be committing another wrong by forcefully
resisting. The law requires that those subject to it comply even with its directives to
suffer the consequences for violating it. It is worth stressing such familiar and obvious
ideas to highlight the fundamental importance of the procedural protections that limit
the government’s awesome power to imprison. These protections, which are
extraordinarily important in their immediate, practical impact on individual lives,
express the society’s respect for individuals’ liberty. By requiring the government to
meet very substantial hurdles before exercising the power to imprison a person, we
recognize the importance of that person’s liberty. Something so precious must not be
taken away lightly. We value it so highly that we make it difficult to destroy. Thus, in
addition to its tangible force, access to the full panoply of constitutional rights assures
individuals that the governmental institutions with power over them place the highest
significance on their liberty.
Yet, despite the elemental significance that constitutional rights have in protecting
us from inappropriate exercises of governmental power, the current system withholds
such rights from individuals on supervised release. As a result, the practice of revoking
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supervised release without a jury trial takes on far-reaching significance. To
systematically deprive individuals of basic constitutional procedural protections for
extended periods of time amounts to treating large populations of people as holding
second-class status. Individuals on supervised release have completed their prison
terms. They are free to resume their lives, to pursue employment, to form
relationships, and to establish all of the other kinds of commitments and projects that
all of us do. But there is one tremendous, unjustifiable difference between individuals
on supervised release and those around them: they may be sent to prison for long
periods of time based on nothing more than a showing to a judge that it is more likely
than not that they have engaged in prohibited activity. That is a tremendous burden to
bear, one that radically and unjustifiably alters the nature of one’s relation to the
institutions of power. Since a term of supervised release composes part of an initial
sentence, it justifiably may impose certain restrictions on an individual’s liberty that
would not otherwise apply, such as refraining from the consumption of alcohol or
traveling to particular locations. However, in enforcing those limitations, the
government should either limit the consequences of violations to relatively minor
matters, such as an adjustment in the details of the stated conditions or provide the
normal panoply constitutional protections.
Individuals not on supervised release can expect and demand that they be granted
the benefit of the doubt should circumstances produce a mistaken impression that they
have engaged in wrongdoing. They enjoy sufficient procedural protections to provide
them, at least in principle, with an excellent chance of avoiding an erroneous
conviction.183 But the preponderance of evidence standard is not nearly so forgiving.
It is easy for it to appear “more likely than not” that a person has committed an act
that they did not, in fact, commit. Yet, when that happens to individuals on supervised
release, it can destroy lives. Consider a person on supervised release who is living in
a lawful manner, and who has fully integrated into life outside of prison. The person
has violated no conditions of release and has committed no crimes, but is, nevertheless,
accused of having done so. The evidence is relatively weak. The government would
have little to no hope of convincing a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Precisely
for this reason, no responsible prosecutor would seriously consider mounting a
criminal prosecution in the case. In this instance, however, the government, knowing
it need only show that the allegations are likely to be true, decides to pursue
revocation. The literal benefit of the doubt available to the rest of us is not on offer.
Despite being able to present only weak and mixed evidence, the judge finds that the
government has met its burden under the “preponderance of the evidence” standard,
and the individual is sentenced to a long prison term. The story of this person’s life
has been rewritten in a way that is sweeping and unjust. Instead of being a success
story of rehabilitation—of turning one’s life around—this now is a recidivist who just
could not stay out of trouble. It is notable that nothing in this tale depends on malice.
The government officials who make the choice to pursue revocation may genuinely
183 As I write this Article in the late Spring of 2020, the nation is roiling with anger and
frustration regarding the death of George Floyd at the hands of police officers. That tragedy has
focused attention on racial injustice in a particularly pointed manner. It is clearly not the case
that everyone in America can enjoy the same kind of confidence that they will be treated justly
by the institutions of official power. In referring to the benefit of the doubt that individuals not
on supervised release receive, I am simply speaking of the applicability of basic procedural
protections, in principle, as required by the Constitution.
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believe in the individual’s guilt and that they are acting to protect the public from an
individual who has proven dangerous more than once. Indeed, instead of receiving a
benefit of the doubt, people in this situation may suffer from the assumption of
officials that they are even more likely to have committed the alleged acts in light of
their criminal histories. Sadly, the people most in need of the benefit of the doubt are
the ones systematically deprived of it.
The Supreme Court’s justification for upholding the current system of supervised
release depends on a legal fiction: that when the government seeks to re-imprison
defendants based on the commission of crimes, those defendants do not stand as the
accused in a criminal prosecution. By recognizing this justification as resting on a
fiction, we can also recognize that the current system effectively establishes a secondclass tier of rights protection, one that is assigned only to a subset of the population
that is, in effect, assigned to a second-class status of personhood.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court has so recently handed down a decision limiting the
government’s power to re-imprison individuals on supervised release without a jury
trial—in United States v. Haymond184—it might seem odd to claim that the issue has
not received the attention it deserves, and that the Court itself has failed to recognize
the injustice of the practice. However, attention to the three opinions in Haymond
reveals that all of the Justices continued to endorse a conception of supervised release
that justifies providing only diminished rights to individuals on supervised release. It
was not only the four dissenting Justices who advocated such a conception. Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion expressed agreement with the general approach
expressed by Justice Alito’s dissent.185 His disagreement with the dissent was quite
limited, as it applied only to certain aspects of the manner in which a particular
provision was framed: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).186 He fully agreed with the dissent, for
instance, that “the role of the judge in a supervised-release proceeding is consistent
with traditional parole,” and that the Apprendi line of cases should not be applied in
the context of supervised release.187 Thus, Justice Breyer’s views, even if adopted by
the Court as a whole, would have little or no effect on most individuals on supervised
release.
It might seem at first that Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion went much further in
reconceiving the nature of supervised release. But that impression is misleading. Not
only did the plurality’s reasoning not disrupt the longstanding justification for
depriving individuals on supervised release of basic rights, it absolutely depended on
that justification.188 The key to the justification for the diminished rights of supervised
release is the view that revocation does not constitute punishment for new offenses,
but rather, punishment for the offenses that were the basis of the initial conviction. Far

184 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019).
185 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
186 Id. at 2386.
187 Id. at 2385.
188 Id. at 2376–77 (plurality opinion).
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from overthrowing that view, the plurality relied on it in applying the Apprendi189 line
of cases to the context of revoking supervised release.190 In Alleyne, one of the most
significant cases building on Apprendi, the Court held that a “fact that, by law,
increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt,” and it applied this principle to facts serving as the
basis for mandatory minimum sentences.191 Alleyne is pivotal to the plurality’s
reasoning in Haymond, and it takes as a premise that the enhancement applies to the
penalty determined by the judge at the initial sentencing.192
While some legal fictions may be benign, the one that the Court has used to uphold
re-imprisonment of individuals on supervised release without a jury trial is pernicious.
Imagining the position of defendants at revocation hearings is illuminating. Consider
the case of an individual serving a term of supervised release who is alleged to have
committed a serious crime, carrying a potential sentence of decades in prison, or even
a life term. As the individual walks into the courtroom, there is a possibility that the
individual will be discharged with no repercussions, and there is a possibility that the
individual will be returned to prison for a lengthy term. The actual outcome will hinge
on whether the judge in that courtroom finds that the government has met its burden
of showing that its allegations are true by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Virtually
the entire course of this individual’s life hangs in the balance, and it turns on whether
the government’s allegations about the individual’s behavior are found to be true. The
individual protests: but how can you determine my fate based on such a thin margin
of evidence, and without providing me with the normal constitutional protections that
others take for granted? The answer that the Court’s jurisprudence suggests is that the
defendant’s protest is meritless. After all, the reasoning goes, the term that might be
handed down would not constitute a punishment for the offenses that the government
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing. It would just be part
of the administration of the initial sentence. The question is whether we can say that
with a straight face.

189 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000).
190 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2376–78.
191 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).
192 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378.
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